Abstract-The paper considers a new method of the Quality of Service (QoS) assurance in opportunistic access to wireless networks using a game theoretic-framework. The perfect full information of the involved links is made known to the central management unit called spectrum broker. Three algorithms of spectrum sharing are proposed. In each algorithm, Cournot oligopoly competition or monopolistic behaviour of the players are considered, and adjustment to the actual available spectrum bandwidth is done to make an efficient use of all available spectrum resources. For the QoS support, spectrum demands are categorized in four traffic classes with special parameters which represent priority classes, the target bit error probability (BEP) and the volume of user demands. The proposed resource sharing algorithms may be used in opportunistic or cognitive wireless networks, and are characterized by low computational complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2012, final transition from the analogue TV system into digital version (DVB) is planned. Turning off the analogue TV transmitters brings the opportunity to reuse more than 100 MHz of VHF/UHF band, which is characterized by relatively advantageous propagation conditions and low attenuation of the radio signal power. New cognitive radio system will be considered to make an efficient use of the newly available bandwidth. Possible algorithms for this use are considered in the European 7 th FP project COGEU, and are addressed by a number of research work packages of the NEWCOM++ Network of Excellence. One of main tasks in COGEU project is the development of a new radio resource sharing algorithms (including those game-theory based) making an efficient use of available resources, and handling the secondary spectrum market as it is shown in Fig.1. [1] Fig.1 . Secondary spectrum market's model [1] In this paper, we present three spectrum-sharing algorithms built in the centralized architecture with the broker as the main management unit, which is responsible for broadcasting information related to spectrum allocation, collecting the demands from the players (mobile units), scheduling the spectrum resources to users according to their demands, and measuring the channel qualities for all links. We consider a utility function based on a secondary user's profit that can be obtained in the Cournot competition model, as well as an adjustment of demands of players to the total capacity of the available bandwidth size (ABS).
Studies on Cournot competition in economy was presented in [2] and [3] . The idea of using the Cournot model in spectrum sharing was considered in [4] , [5] . Consequently, in the same papers the same utility function was used. The model presented there was adopted in our work and developed. Our proposed algorithms and adjustments contribute to the advance of the work presented in [4] and [5] ,
In Section II, the system model is described. Section III contains the description of the new spectrum sharing algorithms. In Section IV numerical results are presented. Conclusions are given in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. General description
Let us consider a system where one Primary User (PU) shares the spectrum with N Secondary Users (SU's). We can assume that the PU is interested in spectrum sharing, and the total bandwidth of spectrum is given by B. An i-th SU demands some portion of spectrum, which is denoted by b i . The cost of the spectrum unit is denoted by c (assumed to be the same for all SU's), and revenue parameter of the SU is denoted by r i per unit of the allocated spectrum.
We can assume that the broker knows the channel state information (CSI) of all links. For simplicity effective SNR concept was used, which means that the CSI is hidden in one parameter called effective SNR, and denoted by γ i for i-th player. Such an effective-SNR concept is presented in [6] . It allows for mapping of the frequency-selective channel SNRs in the considered band to one effective γ i value used to make an efficient decision on the adaptive transmission parameters, e.g. adopted power, modulation constellation or coding scheme and rate. Due to this concept the signalling is reduced to the minimum because only one number is sent to the broker. The broker may also calculate γ i for all players.
In the effective scheduling process, the broker uses the notion of the spectral efficiency for i-th player ( [7] ): 
and i e P is the target Bit Error Probability (BEP) of an i-th player. The secondary users send only the necessary information to broker about the traffic classes, which they want to be assigned to transmit their data. The traffic class is described by two parameters ( i e P , r i ). As a result of this action, the game is with full information which is processed by the broker. We can also assume that users, which compete for the spectrum always have enough data to send. In other case we can assume that they are in an idle state.
B. Cournot Oligopoly and Monopolistic Behaviour
Let us consider the static Cournot competition to model the spectrum sharing market. In that spectrum market, the secondary users compete for available bandwidth. If there is only one player the market is monopolized, if two then we have the duopoly, if there are more than two players we have the oligopoly [3] . The strategy of each player is related to the amount of spectrum which they want to acquire (b i ). PU charges secondary users using the cost function given by [4] :
where b is vector of (b 1 , …, b N ), x is a fixed cost of spectrum sharing, and y is the cost of the spectrum unit, which affects (increases) players' cost, and thus also reduces their demands, τ is the factor additionally impacting the cost, as well as the fairness of spectrum sharing. We consider cost function with x = 0 and τ = 1 for the oligopoly case, and x = 0 and τ = 1, 2, 3 respectively for the monopolistic behaviour described below. The revenue of the i-th player is related to the obtained spectral efficiency, and is given by [4] 
(4) The profit of the i-th player is given by the revenue minus the cost:
The above profit is a concave function of b i [4] , and thus, we can find its maximum by solving the equation:
For τ = 1, and in the oligopoly case, we obtain the best response function of an i-th player (for other players the formula is the same) which is given by
To obtain the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this game, the following set of equations must be solved. For two players (For τ = 1, we can denote that set of equations as the multiplication of matrices.)
where A is the square matrix (with dimensions N×N) with elements given by
and the elements of matrix Z are given by
Thus, we obtain the Nash Equilibrium (NE) as vector b * which is the best strategy for each user and is given by
(11) It is worth mentioning that the elements of matrix A -1 (as matrix A) may have one of two possible values.
For the monopoly case, we don't have to solve any set of equations and the best response function (adopted amount of spectrum) for an i-th player is given by ( )
We can assume that we are interested only in solution where b * i is nonnegative and then the result for any user is given by
(13)
C. Adjustment to the available spectrum size
For a small number of players (especially in monopoly and duopoly), the sum of bandwidth demands may be lower than the ABS. We can also have a situation when the demands of all players are higher than ABS (it can happen when users have different values of the revenue parameter r i or when they behave as if they were monopolists and use utility function as in the monopoly). In the first case, some spectrum is not utilized. The PU is interested in leasing all the spectrum, so the broker can decide to give the rest of spectrum to players as bonus. In the second case, the problem arises because the players have demands which exceed ABS, especially when there are different traffic classes (with different revenue and BEP parameters), and one class is prioritized over the other ones. Also, there may be a situation that all the available band is given to one user with the most favourable parameters' values what totally neglects the fairness (other users are not served). Below, we present the improvement to the static Cournot game with demands adjustment to the ABS.
It is important to say that when an i-th demand achieved from (11) is lower than 0 we set b i * = 0, and if a demand is higher than ABS, b i * = B. This is reasonable because a spectrum demand should be always higher than zero and lower than the available spectrum band.
The sum of all demands D equals
We denote S as the number of spectrum units available in a given band, and s i is the number of spectrum units ultimately allocated to the i-th player (and also the result of scheduling process). We can write adjustment as mathematical operation:
Due to that operation we assure that Cournot competition will always give the right solution between zero and the ABS. Let us note an interesting fact, that we can engineer demands of users by changing almost all parameters (x, y, τ, r i , i e P ).
In the next section, three algorithms of spectrum sharing will be presented. In each algorithm adjustment of the Cournot game to ABS will be the key operation.
III. NEW ALGORITHMS OF SPECTRUM SHARING
A. Cournot Oligopoly Competition with Adjustment to ABS
Let us consider the classic Cournot competition with full information in the network architecture with the centralized management (the broker). Let us define the following new algorithm of spectrum sharing (Adjustment Algorithm 1):
1.
The broker informs the players about the new game using the broadcast channel, e.g. the so-called cognitive pilot channel.
2.
The players inform the broker about the nature of traffic they want to transmit ( i e P , r i ).
3.
After collecting all data, the broker solves the Cournot competition according to (11) (for τ = 1).
4.
The broker makes adjustment of demands of all players to the ABS according to formulas in (14) and (15).
5.
The broker informs the players about resources they may use. 6.
The players transmit data during time T. The broker calculates the statistics of the traffic classes and spectrum demands for the players. As an example we can consider the game of two players, and the parameters r 1 =10/3, r 2 =10/3, γ 1 = 10, γ 2 = 10, 1 e P = 10e-4, 2 e P = 10e-4, B = 5 MHz. In the classic Cournot competition without adjustment to the ABS, both players would achieve about 1.75 MHz. After using our adjustment each player achieve 2.50 MHz. Both values may be easily calculated as numbers of spectrum units. Fig.2 . compares our new algorithm with the classic solution.
In the case when one of the players has higher revenue parameter r i and better channel condition than the other one, our proposed solution is similar to that from the classic Cournot game. When both players have similar parameters, both players will get more spectrum with the new solution. Resources assigned to players sum to the total available bandwidth. In this algorithm, a player with high signal to noise ratio may get all available spectrum and the second one may not get anything. That effect is similar to effect in classic Cournot competition without adjustment to the ABS when NE for one player results in a higher demand than the available bandwidth and for other in a demand lower than zero. 
B. Cournot Oligopoly Competition with Adjustment to the ABS and with Minimum Spectrum Demand
Let us consider another algorithm similar to algorithm 1, in which one player has no interest to demand any spectrum (when her parameter r i has a low value, e.g. r 1 = 5/3), and the second player is aggressive (which means high r 2 , e.g. r 2 = 10/3). That first player has a minimum demand which is calculated as one half of the demand in the monopoly situation. Now, let us define a new algorithm (Adjustment Algorithm 2), which is the same as algorithm 1 except for step 3 which is:
3.
After collecting all data the broker solves the Cournot competition according (11) (for τ = 1) and when the demand of the player is less than half of the minimum demand then that value is processed in next steps.
As an example, we consider the game with two players with the following parameters r 1 = 5/3, r 2 = 15/3, γ 1 = 10, γ 2 = 10, 1 e P = 10e-4, 2 e P = 10e-4, B = 5 MHz. In the classic Cournot competition, player 1 would be allocated 0 MHz and player 2 would be allocated 4.37 MHz. After using adjustments as in our considered algorithm 1 both players achieve 0 MHz and 5 MHz respectively. When we decide to use algorithm 2 both players will get around 0.65 MHz and 4.35 MHz respectively. We can see that the player with low revenue parameter value and not a good channel condition gets some portion of the spectrum. Fairness of that solution is better than in algorithm 1 but may not be sufficient what has been the motivation for considering another option for the adjustments to ABS.
C. Monopoly Behaviour in Cournot Competition with ABS
Let us consider an algorithm, in which each user plays the game as if she has been a monopolist, which means that she demands as much spectrum as it pays off in situation of being only one player in the spectrum market. Now, let us define a new algorithm (Adjustment Algorithm 3). The broker makes the same steps as in algorithm 1 and 2 except for step 3, in which it uses formula (13) for calculating the demands. Using this algorithm results in very low complexity of calculations for many players. In algorithms 1 and 2 calculations become more and more complex with the increasing number of players. In algorithm 3, the same calculations for each user are easy to make, and the only information that is needed is the traffic class and the average signal to noise ratio. Calculations for one player require only the information about her own parameters not about parameters of other players. When the revenue parameters are chosen correctly, the demands of players are always lower than the ABS. Then, the broker calculates the adjustment to the ABS what is crucial in algorithm 3 because the sum of demands for more than two players is almost always higher than the ABS (what reflects their monopolistic behaviour). Thus, let us consider the following situations which may occur for particular algorithms, and accentuate to results achieved in algorithm 3 which are put in Table 1 Algorithm 3 limits the spectrum assigned to the players with high revenue and allows the players with low revenue and bad channel conditions to have an access to some portion of spectrum. Algorithm 3 is the most fair for all users while algorithm 1 is the best in prioritizing the traffic classes. 
A. System Assumptions
The section shows results of simulation of the following system with 32 players and 5 MHz of the ABS. 500 spectrum units are used (when one spectrum unit size is 10 kHz; K = 500). The players are equally divided into four traffic classes with different revenue parameters, which can be translated to different priorities of the traffic (r 1 = 4/3, r 2 = 8/3, r 3 = 12/3, r 4 = 16/3). Effective signal to noise ratio concept was used (SNR is in range from 9 to 21 dB uniformly distributed due to the imperfect power management process which is assumed). Target BEP (the same for all players) is equal 10e-4. A user may demand from 0 to 5 MHz of the available spectrum. Centralized architecture is used with broker. It is assumed that users which are in game have always data for transmission. Monte Carlo method has been used with 10000 games in single run (one game means one access for resources for all players), 100 runs were made. The following parameters have been applied:
• for algorithm 1:
• for algorithm 3: x = 0, y = 1, τ = 1, 2, 3 respectively. Fig.7 . shows the average spectrum assignment (in spectrum units) to a single user per traffic class. It is a single run of 1000 games between the players. Let us note that for our setup, only users from two classes with the highest revenue parameter obtain some spectrum for transmission. About more than a half of the users is not served. In Fig.7 . the blue solid line shows the average number of spectrum units per all users. Fig.8 . shows the average spectrum assignment (in spectrum units) to a single user per traffic class. It is a single run of 1000 games between players. For this algorithm all users achieve spectrum for transmission. In Fig.8 . blue solid line shows average number of spectrum units per all users. Fig.9 ., Fig.10., Fig.11 . show the average spectrum assignment (in spectrum units) to a single user per traffic class for τ = 1, 2, 3 respectively. For this algorithm all users achieve at least some spectrum for transmission. In all mentioned figures blue solid line shows average number of spectrum units per all users. Table 2 shows the average number of spectrum units assigned to a single user of one of four traffic classes in each considered algorithm. We can see that algorithm 1 is useful when we want to transmit only the traffic with high priority. Algorithm 3 is the most fair and allows a single user with the low revenue to get more resources than in algorithm 2. The total spectral efficiency for all algorithms is similar. V. CONCLUSION The paper has presented the idea of sharing of the resources with the Cournot competition. Traffic classes and adjustment to ABS has been added to the original model. Our model can be used in multiple wireless algorithms independently of the ABS (an example of 5 MHz of the available spectrum may be used as basic Cournot game of the ABS with any number of spectrum units in a wireless cognitive radio system, and the revenue for each class may be arbitrarily chosen). Another advantage of this new model is the flexible manner in which the broker manages the traffic in the considered area. It may be done by changing the revenue parameters for any class, i.e. the broker may take decisions on the traffic priorities transmitted in a network at any moment. Moreover, new class of transmission may be defined (e.g. for voice transmissionthat class will demand relatively a small number of spectrum units and that value may be granted unconditionally, the rest of the resources may be distributed in the Cournot competition). More traffic classes may be added or removed.
B. Adjustment Algorithm 1 Results
C. Adjustment Algorithm 2 Results
D. Adjustment Algorithm 3 Results
E. Algorithms Comparison
TABLE 2 ALGORITHMS COMPARISON -SIMULATION RESULTS
RESULTS (IN SPECTRUM UNITS PER TRAFFIC CLASS
Our three new algorithms may be easily adopted in any wireless cognitive radio, depending on the traffic which must be carried, its priorities and on the system requirements.
